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THE PAROLE BOARD'S DUTY
OF SELF-REGULATION
When the state determines that it should deprive a citizen of his
liberty by imprisonment, it undertakes a coordinate obligation to
decide when and under what conditions he shall be released. In
the majority of cases this release will take the form of a parole.1
Most states place the ultimate parole decision in the hands of
administrative tribunals2 which operate within a framework of
general constraints imposed by statutory powersa and judicially
imposed sentences. 4
Although the details of the parole agency's operation may vary
widely among jurisdictions,5 an element common to all is the vast
amount of discretion exercised by agency members in performing
their duties. 6 There is growing concern over the legal rights of
prisoners 7 including those rights affecting the decision whether to
release on parole an individual prisoner.8 Nevertheless, this deci-
1 Over 60 percent of all persons released from state prisons in 1964 were paroled. In
Michigan the figure is nearly 90 percent. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 61 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS].
2 Id. at 65- 67.3See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDI-
TIONS OF SENTENCE 222-23 (1969).
'See id. at 193- 214.
5 See TASK FORCE: CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 65-67.
6See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 126- 33 (1969).7 See generally Clements & Ferguson, Judicial Responsibility for Prisoners: The Pro-
cess That is Due, 4 CREIGHTON L. REV. 47 (1970); Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing
Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970); Jacob, Prison Discipline and
Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIn. L. REV. 227 (1970); Martin, Adminis-
trative Fairness in Corrections, 1969 WIs. L. REV. 587; Turner, Establishing the Rule of
Law in Prisons:A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971):
Note, Procedural Due Process in Peno-Correctional Administration: Progression and
Regression, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 468 (197 1); Comment, Federal Court Intervention in
State Prison Internal Disciplinary Hearings to Guarantee Fourteenth Amendment Proce-
dural Due Process, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 931 (1971); Millemann, Prison Disciplinary
Hearings and Procedural Due Process- The Requirement of a Full Administrative Hear-
ing, 31 MD. L. REV. 27 (1971).
8 See, e.g., Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert: Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 828-32 (1961); Comment, Due Process: The Right to
Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1968).
The courts also have begun to apply the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to
parole release determinations. See, e.g., Campbell v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968)
(equal protection violated by denial of parole consideration on basis of unreliable factual
determination); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193 (1971)
(in most cases the parole board must state reasons for denial of parole; not clear whether
holding is based on constitutional doctrines).
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sion is the result of a proceeding far removed from the model of
adjudication applicable at other stages of the adversary system
which incorporates elements of due process.
This article examines the Michigan Parole Board in terms of its
structure, mode of operation, and certain legal issues raised by its
procedures. The note argues that the Board's and the legislature's
concept of professional, scientific decision-making is not an ade-
quate substitute for the checks and balances which confine and
control the discretion of other governmental agencies, and further-
more, that this concept is inconsistent with both the letter and
spirit of the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act (MAPA or
Act).9 Thereafter, an approach is suggested by which the Act can
be used as a tool to legitimate and rationalize Parole Board
procedures.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PAROLE BOARD
The Michigan Department of Corrections was created in
1937.10 The Bureau of Pardons and Paroles was established with-
in the Department and among its officers were the three members
of the Parole Board. The new department was to be supervised by
a Corrections Commission made up of five gubernatorial appoint-
ees serving fixed terms and receiving per diem compensation.
They were to appoint the Director of Corrections, who in turn
would appoint assistant directors. One of these, an assistant direc-
tor in charge of pardons and paroles, was to serve as chairman of
the Parole Board. The other two members of the Board were to
be chosen for their "familiarity with the problems of penology.""
They were all to be full-time employees who could be removed by
the Commission only for cause after a hearing.
The power to grant or deny parole was given entirely to the
Board. Release was to be granted solely on the initiative of its
members, and their action in releasing a prisoner was not to be
reviewable if in compliance with law. 12 The Board's authority in
this respect was subject to the following limitations:
(a) That no prisoner shall be given his liberty on parole until
the board has reasonable assurance after consideration of all
of the facts and circumstances, including the prisoner's men-
9 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.201-315 (Supp. 1972) (originally enacted as the
Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, P.A. 1969, No. 306) [hereinafter cited as
MAPAI.
10 Mich. P.A. 1937, No. 255 (superseded 1947).
11 Id. ch. 111, § 2.
12 Id. at § 4.
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tal and social attitude, that he will not become a menace to
society or to the public safety;
(b) That no parole shall be so granted to any prisoner until he
has served the minimum term imposed by the court less such
allowances for good time or special good time as he may be
entitled to by statute: Provided, That prisoners shall be eli-
gible for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms
of imprisonment whenever the sentencing judge or his succes-
sor in office, and only upon the request of the parole board,
shall give his written approval of the parole of such prisoner
prior to the expiration of such minimum terms of imprison-
ment;
(c) That no prisoner shall be released on parole until the
parole board shall have satisfactory evidence that arrange-
ments have been made for such honorable and useful employ-
ment as he is capable of performing, or for his care if he is ill
or incapacitated. 13
The power to grant pardons and commutations remained with the
Governor, but applications were to be submitted to and in-
vestigated by the Parole Board, and the Governor was to act after
receiving the Board's recommendation.
The Parole Board's authority, along with the limitations and
mandatory procedures governing that authority, have remained
largely unchanged since 1937.14 The philosophy of the Board and
-the charcteristics of its members have also been fairly consistent.
From the time of its establishment the Department of Corrections
has taken great pride in the "professionalism" of its Parole Board.
The first report issued by the Department described the Parole
Board as a
board of non-partisan membership [having the facilities and
purpose to confine its action for or against parole to accord
with positive scientific parole principles entirely apart from
the vexatious and malignant influences which justify adverse
criticism of parole in several localities.' s
The emphasis on professionalism has been maintained as the
exact composition of the Board has varied, 16 until today it con-
sists of five civil service employees. They are the only officers in
the Department of Corrections, aside from the Director, who are
appointed by the Corrections Commission.
13 Id. at § 3.
14 SeeMICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 791.232, .233, .235 (1968).
'5 MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 69 (1938).
1
6 See Mich. P.A. 1947, 2d Ex. Sess., No. 4 § 30; Mich. P.A. 1948, 1st Ex. Sess., No.
35: Mich. P.A. 1953, No. 232 § 32: MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 791.232 (1968).
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In making its parole decisions, the Board must operate, of
course, within the limits described by the minimum and maximum
sentences imposed on the prisoners. For most offenses the max-
imum penalty is set by the legislature, and the sentencing court
may pronounce a minimum of any length not exceeding two-thirds
of the maximum. 17 For a few very serious offenses1 8 the court has
complete discretion to set both the minimum and the maximum or
in some cases to pronounce a life sentence.19 For first degree
murder the court must pronounce a life sentence, and the prisoner
can never be paroled. 20
It seems likely that a significant change may soon be made in
Michigan's indeterminate sentence laws. A bill 21 which has al-
ready passed the Michigan House 22 and is now being considered
by the State Senate Committee on the Judiciary 23 would com-
pletely eliminate the court's authority to set a minimum term of
imprisonment. 24 Once convicted and sentenced, a person's dis-
charge from prison at any time short of the statutory maximum
would be entirely a matter of administrative discretion.
Thus, the release decision has become the province of five
experts who presumably have the training and experience neces-
sary to make the most scientifically accurate judgment as to who
should be freed from prison and under what conditions. The
realities of the Parole Board's decision-making process, however,
are not entirely consistent with its professional image. In eval-
17 People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972) (any sentence which
provides for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to
comply with the indeterminate sentence statute).
18 These offenses include: armed assault with intent to rob, MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.89 (1968); armed robbery, id. § 750.529; second degree murder, id. § 750.317; rape,
id. § 750.520; conspiracy, id. §750.157A; kidnapping, id. §750.349; bank safe or vault
robbery, id. § 750.53 1; assault with intent to commit murder, id. § 750.83; and enticing a
child under fourteen years of age, id. § 750.350.
19 A person sentenced to life imprisonment or to a very long term for a crime other than
first degree murder is eligible for parole after ten years, but he cannot be paroled if the
sentencing court objects, and the parole board must conform to special procedural require-
ments designed to assure representation of the public interest. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 791.234 (1968).
20 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.3 16 (1968). Today the mandatory life sentence for
first degree murder does not mean that everyone convicted of that crime spends the rest of
his life in jail; it simply complicates the parole process by creating a need for executive
clemency. The Parole Board's policy regarding a person serving a mandatory life sentence
is to give him an interview after ten years and to review his record annually thereafter.
Generally, the Board recommends executive clemency and the prisoner is eventually
released. The average time served before release on a mandatory life sentence is
twenty-four years. Interview with Leonard R. McConnell, member, Michigan Parole
Board, in Lansing, Michigan, Oct., 197 1.
21 Mich. H.B. 4004 (1971). This bill is an amended version of the Michigan Revised
Penal Code published by a special committee of the State Bar in 1967.
22 MICHIGAN HOUSE JOURNAL, Feb. 29, 1972, at 758.
23 MICHIGAN SENATE JOURNAL, Feb. 29, 1972, at 437.
24 Mich. H.B. 4004§ 1401 (1971).
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uating its variance from the ideal, it is necessary to consider more
closely the procedures for making parole release decisions. 25
II. THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY2 6
The process of rational decision-making necessary for the
Board to reach an optimal, or at least acceptable, resolution to
each problem presented to it may be divided into three stages: (1)
factual investigation, (2) evaluation and analysis, and (3) decision.
In practice, of course, the dividing lines between these activities
are neither clear nor rigid. Nonetheless, each represents a neces-
sary step which must be performed in some manner if the result is
in fact to be a rational decision.
The first two parts of the decision-making process, factual
investigation and evaluation and analysis, together constitute what
lawyers call factfinding. This consists of the gathering and mean-
ingful assimilation of data (evidence) in order to reach conclusions
of fact. In order to gather the appropriate data it is essential to
determine what facts are relevant and necessary to making a
parole release decision. Facts which are relevant but not very
necessary might be ignored to save time and energy. It might be
desirable to ignore even some very helpful facts if the ability of
the factfinder to deal with them rationally is in doubt, or if other
considerations (such as an individual's privacy) indicate that cer-
tain facts should not be considered. Evaluation of the data in-
volves judgments as to the credibility of the sources and the
reliability of the methods used in gathering the data. If there are
conflicting data, reference will often be made to a system of
presumptions in order to arrive at factual conclusions. Decision
consists of applying to these factual determinations any relevant
25This note focuses primarily on the procedures employed in deciding when a person
imprisoned under an indeterminate sentence is to be released. This includes determination
of the conditions of parole and date of final discharge. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 791.233, .242 (1968). The Parole Board is also called upon to decide: (1) whether to
release a prisoner before the expiration of his minimum term when the sentencing judge
gives his approval (id. §791.233 (b) ); (2) when to release a prisoner who has received a
very long minimum sentence or a life sentence for a crime other than first degree murder,
and who has served at least ten years of his sentence (id. §791.234); and (3) whether to
order the reimprisonment of a parolee who has been returned for an alleged violation of his
parole (id. § 791.248 (Supp. 1972)). The Board also serves as an investigatory and
advisory agency to assist the Governor in the Exercise of his pardon and commutation
powers (id. § 791.244).
26 The data used in this part was obtained by observation of parole hearings at Jackson
State Prison on Feb. 22, 1972; observation of an executive session of the Michigan Parole
Board on Feb. 24, 1972; an interview with Mr. Leonard McConnell, member, Michigan
Parole Board, in Lansing, Oct., 1971; and an interview with Messrs. Thurston, Buchko,
and Fuller, members, Michigan Parole Board, in Lansing, Feb. 24, 1972.
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policies or rules which have not yet entered the process, or whose
applicability to the situation at hand has not yet been exhausted.
The actual mechanics of the Parole Board's operation are rela-
tively simple. A brief explanation will aid the detailed analysis
which follows. Each prisoner is considered for parole shortly
before the expiration of his minimum term of imprisonment and at
least once annually thereafter. One board member studies the
prisoner's file and on that basis either defers to the judgment of
the members who will conduct the hearing or votes for or against
parole. If he votes against parole, he forwards the file to another
board member who studies it and has the same options as the first
member. Then a hearing with the prisoner is conducted by two
members who have not studied the file in advance. At the close of
the hearing, each of them either votes or moves for consideration
by the entire Board. If at this point there are three votes either for
or against parole, the decision is announced to the prisoner and
entered in his file. Otherwise, the case is considered by the entire
Board in executive session. It is very rare that more than thirty
days elapse after a prisoner's hearing before he is informed of the
Board's decision and given some brief explanation of the reasons
for the decision.
A. Factual Investigation
A very broad range of data is considered relevant to the parole
release decision. The Parole Board has a file on each prisoner
which contains a wide range of documents. 27 Although some
27The file contains the following documents:
(1) the court order setting the limits on the prisoner's sentence;
(2) the report of the presentence investigation;
(3) a transcript of the court's remarks at the time of sentencing (if available);
(4) a state police rap sheet (a record of all arrests and convictions);
(5) the Reception Diagnostic Center rap sheet (mainly identification data);
(6) the psychologist's intake report (IQ, predictive tests, personality tests);
(7) the recommendation of the Reception Diagnostic Center Classification
Committee concerning placement (a statement of the prisoner's problems and
treatment needs, and the institution to which he should be confined);
(8) reports of actions (security level, disciplinary assignments, etc.; reasons
given) by the institution's classification committee;
(9) the parole eligibility report (prepared by a prison counselor) containing a
description of the prisoner's work experience while in prison and the quality
of his work, educational and other programs and activities he has engaged in,
his conduct, and his parole plans; also the counselor's evaluation of his
parole-readiness);
(10) evaluation by the psychiatric clinic (if available);
(11) reports of past parole board actions (if any) and reasons;
[VOL. 6:13 1
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board members have stated that they would like to have more
information in these files, it is not clear what additional in-
formation the Board could use. One member has suggested that a
transcript of the trial testimony could sometimes be helpful.
The range of items in the file discloses that not all of the
documents are directly concerned with the factual basis for the
parole release decision. The court order setting the limits of the
prisoner's sentence, for example, serves only to define the Parole
Board's jurisdiction in the case. But most of the material is re-
garded as factual, and the Board studies it carefully, before reach-
ing a decision. Consideration of some of the material in the file
seems to be essential before the Board can reach a decision. In
one hearing which was observed, the board members found that
the prisoner's file contained no presentence report. They imme-
diately discontinued consideration of the case until a copy of the
report could be obtained. In some cases the Board will not pro-
ceed to a decision until it has received a current evaluation from
the prison's psychiatric clinic.
The Parole Board is required by statute to "cause each prisoner
to be brought before it" at least one month before the first day on
which he is eligible for parole.2 8 In addition, the Director of
Corrections has directed the Parole Board to interview at least
once each year each prisoner who is in the Board's jurisdiction. 29
Although these interviews are referred to as "hearings," and the
prisoner is usually told that he has a right to speak and ask
questions, there is no indication that anyone has ever thought of
them as "evidentiary hearings" within the meaning of the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act.30 They do not offer an opportunity for
the prisoner to present evidence and arguments to justify his
release. Rather they provide a chance for the board members to
observe the prisoner and thus gather evidence on their own.
(12) the parole agent's report (home and employment situation awaiting the
prisoner if he is released);
(13) parole violation reports from previous periods of parole (if any);
(14) copies of warrants issued for parole violations (if any);
(15) the institution's report of action taken when the prisoner was returned
for a parole violation (if any);
(16) copies of orders made by the parole board when the prisoner was
returned for a parole violation (if any);
(17) any correspondence which has been received by the parole board con-
cerning the prisoner; and
(18) parole board notations of any telephone calls or other oral commu-
nications received concerning the prisoner.28 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.235 (1968).
29 Michigan Department of Corrections, Departmental Directive PPE-5, Feb. 22, 1972.3 0 See MAPA, supra note 9, §§ 24.203, 27 1-306.
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The hearing is conducted by two members of the Board. One
acts as chairman, questioning the prisoner and answering his
questions. The other studies the file and observes the prisoner.
The length of the hearing ranges up to twenty minutes, depending
on the difficulty of the case. So far as can be determined, the chief
purpose of the hearing is to gather evidence concerning what the
board members call "sincerity." A prisoner is sincere if his state-
ments at the hearing are consistent with the information contained
in his file, if he does not try to make excuses, and if he shows a
willingness to accept the direction of corrections officials and
counselors in handling his problems.
Since most members have worked for many years in the De-
partment of Corrections, they are personally acquainted with
many of the recidivist prisoners who come before them. Recollec-
tions of these acquaintances are considered relevant and helpful.
Anyone who wishes may write or call the Parole Board or go to
the Board's office and discuss the case of any prisoner. Such
communications are entered in the prisoner's file and may be
considered in making parole release decisions.
The Parole Board itself in fact gathers very little information.
Most of the information it relies upon is contained in the prison-
er's file and is gathered by probation officers, parole agents, prison
counselors, and other corrections personnel. These persons are
not under the Board's control, and it can use only what they
supply. Moreover, the completeness of the information available
may vary. Board members say that presentence reports from
some counties are practically useless, while those from others are
generally excellent. At least one member is very dissatisfied with
the information-gathering services available to the Board; but
because the Board has no control over those services, it can do
very little to improve the situation.
The Parole Board does not positively exclude any evidence
from its consideration unless such evidence is irrelevant, and
nothing is irrelevant if it pertains in any way to the prisoner who
is being considered for parole. The Board often uses hearsay
evidence and other evidence from the prisoner's file that would
not be admissible in a court of law. Insofar as they give the matter
conscious attention, the Parole Board members seem to justify
their unrestrained use of evidence by arguing that they are not
adjudicating rights but rather evaluating rehabilitative progress
and predicting behavior.
Whatever the merits of this position, several conclusions may
be drawn about the Board's methods of fact determination. First,
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the process is neither adversary nor inquisitorial in nature, but
consists of a series of disjunctive investigations and reports with-
out central control. Second, it clearly lacks the safeguards that are
thought to insure fairness and reliability in judicial factfinding, and
factfinding under the Administrative Procedures Act. Third, it
nevertheless provides usable factual statements in each of the
more than 7,000 parole release cases which the Board must con-
sider each year. This is important when one considers that the
Board cannot depend on settlement or stipulation to resolve any
of the factual issues it faces, and that to employ a more rigorous
procedure in resolving every such issue would entail burdensome
costs in time, money, and manpower.
B. Evaluation and Analysis
1. Evaluating the Evidence-Since the Parole Board has no
control over the people who gather the evidence which it uses in
making decisions, it is not in a sound position to study the evi-
dence critically. Because it lacks alternative sources the Board
has no choice other than to use what evidence is offered. If
anyone judges the credibility of the sources, it is the parole
agents, probation officers, and counselors who collect the evi-
dence. It seems that no one evaluates the reliability of the meth-
ods used in gathering the evidence. Some board members harbor
serious doubts about the reliability of these methods, but they
simply do not have an opportunity to scrutiflize them.
Despite these reservations, there is a strong presumption in
favor of the accuracy of the material contained in a prisoner's file.
It would not be a significant exaggeration to say that the reports in
the file are regarded collectively as a statement of the facts in the
case rather than as evidence. This statement of facts can be
supplemented but not contradicted by the board members' own
observations. There is also a strong presumption that factual
allegations made by the prisoner are unreliable; indeed, if there is
any evidence that is so unreliable that it cannot be considered, it
is the prisoner's statement of the facts of his case. The prisoner is
there to be observed, not to present his case.
The evidence which the Board members themselves gather at
Parole Board hearings and through other contacts with prisoners
is subject to more extensive critical evaluation. Board members
are very wary of being "taken in" by a prisoner. They believe that
the most dangerous and least rehabilitated prisoners are often the
most skilled at "putting up a front" to fool the Board. Therefore,
FALL 19721
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they make very cautious use of their own observations. Corre-
spondence about prisoners is sporadically available and only oc-
casionally useful. When it is used, it is not generally viewed as
critically as are the observations of board members.
2. Analyzing the Results-The legislature has provided that
no prisoner shall be given his liberty on parole until the board
has reasonable assurance after consideration of all the facts
and circumstances, including the prisoner's mental and social
attitude, that he will not become a menace to society or to the
public safety....
This provision requires that the Parole Board predict how a
prisoner will behave if he is released. Assuming that the Board
can make such a prediction, the statute does not tell them when to
release a prisoner; it simply defines the classes of those who must
not be released and those who may be released at a particular
time. In order to define the narrower class of those who ought to
be released, the Board has developed further criteria.3 2 In addi-
tion to predicting the prisoner's behavior after release, the Board
also attempts to evaluate his progress in rehabilitation. It is
thought that each prisoner reaches a point when his reformation
would be achieved more effectively if he were to be released.
There also comes a point when further imprisonment is actually
counterproductive in terms of rehabilitation. The determination of
whether a particular prisoner has reached either of these points is
considered relevant to the parole release decision.
To predict behavior and evaluate rehabilitative progress, the
Board relies on scientific analysis of the data gathered about each
prisoner. Part of this is performed by the probation officers, coun-
selors, psychologists, and psychiatrists who gather the data, and
part by the board members themselves. The analysis is heavily
clinical as opposed to statistical. It appears that great reliance is
placed on the trained intuition of the people who perform the
analysis, and little disciplined study or thought is involved.
The members of the Board are much more willing to substitute
their own analysis for that found in the prisoner's file than they
are to substitute their own observations for those in the file.
Although the people who write reports for the file are thought to
have a better opportunity to observe the prisoner and gather data,
they are not generally any more skilled at analysis than the board
31 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.233 (1968).
32 See Dawson, The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: Study of Parole Criteria in Law
and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243.
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members. The Board does show some deference to the findings of
the specialists in the psychiatric clinic.
The conclusions reached as a result of this process are what a
lawyer calls "expert facts." However, the process and its result
differ from the way expert facts are derived in other contexts in at
least three significant respects. First, little effort is made to sepa-
rate the data from the analysis. The people who collect the data
also perform the analysis, and they carry on both activities at the
same time. The Board does not use any mechanism which would
serve the purpose that hypothetical questions addressed to ex-
perts are supposed to serve at a trial. Second, the people who
must consider the analysis (the Board) are among those who have
performed it. This raises a danger that the analysis may be accept-
ed uncritically and its conclusions given more weight than they
deserve. Finally, the analysis is not subjected to any scrutiny like
the cross-examination which occurs at a trial.
C. Decision on the Facts
Having discerned the facts and drawn out their implications,
the Board must finally apply a system of norms and values which
will produce a decision in the given case. The statute which
governs the Board's decisions gives only the broadest sort of
guidance. 33 The task is further complicated by the fact that in
many cases the Board must balance competing social policies.
Among the questions of public policy which the Board must
resolve are these: What kinds of activity make a person a "men-
ace to society"? What degree of certainty constitutes "reasonable
assurance" that a prisoner will not be a menace to society if
released? To what extent are considerations of economy relevant
to parole release decisions? To what extent should parole be used
as a reward for good conduct within the prison or withheld as a
penalty for poor conduct? Should the Parole Board review the
judicial determination of the degree of punishment appropriate for
a particular crime?
The Board's procedure for making decisions of this nature is
obscure and somewhat disorganized. It has not developed a com-
prehensive set of explicit rules, nor does it regularly use its prior
decisions or study them to find the unifying principles or trends.
The members often give a one- or two-sentence explanation of
their decision in each case, but these statements are usually
33 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
FALL 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
simple allegations of fact or conclusions concerning the prisoner's
rehabilitative progress and dangerousness. Because the members
of the Board regard themselves as behavioral specialists and place
great emphasis on the maintenance of high professional standards
in this respect, they do not discuss the normative rules or the
policy considerations which guide the Board's action. The empha-
sis on a scientific or clinical approach seems to engender a certain
confidence and a reluctance to acknowledge that the Board's
decisions do involve normative principles and considerations of
public policy.
III. RESTRICTING ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
A. The Need for Discipline
The foregoing sketch of Parole Board procedure clearly illus-
trates the degree to which the process is unstructured and its
bases unexamined. The factual data available to the Board is
sometimes sparse and practically never testable. In the vast bulk
of its work the Board operates without the assistance of advo-
cates.3 4 The Board does not make explicit findings of fact: it does
not review the evidence, make known what is believed and what
is doubted, and indicate factual conclusions. Nor does it clearly
state the principles and reasoning on which its decision is based in
each case.3 5 Certainly such substantial violations of the ideal of
due process cannot be easily justified for an agency which has
such profound power to affect both human freedom and commu-
nity safety.36
34 Counsel are excluded from parole release hearings. Mich. Dep't of Corrections R.
791.321(3) (1970). Although anyone, including a lawyer, may discuss a prisoner's case
with members of the Board and may present "information or documents," very few
prisoners retain lawyers to assist them in parole matters.
35 Departmental Directive PPE-5, supra note 29, requires that
[l]n each case where there is a denial of parole, the Parole Board will place a
statement in the inmate's central office file, with a copy to the institution
officials, indicating the reason for the action.
The Parole Board complies with this requirement. Professor Dawson gives this example of
a reason: "resents institutional authority, jail house lawyer, denies offense, has a bad
temper, has a generally poor institutional adjustment." Dawson, supra note 32, at 256.
What one means by a "reason" depends on the purpose the reason is intended to serve.
The statements made by the Parole Board to justify denials may be reasons in the sense
that they tell the prisoner what changes might improve his parole chances and provide the
prison administration with an explanation for calming dissatisfied prisoners, but they are
not explications of the ratio decidendi which might be useful to a reviewing court or to a
future board using the decision as precedent.
36 To demand that discretion be disciplined is not to imply any personal criticism of the
board members. Apparently they do as thorough a job as is generally expected of them.
Moreover, the Board labors under the burden of an immense caseload. During 1971 the
Board decided 10,541 cases; each case was considered by at least three members. The
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Arguments calling for the application of due process concepts
in the parole context are often met with the assertion that parole
determinations are made by scientific professionals who have no
need for legal techniques. Of course, science and law are not
mutually exclusive fields of endeavor. When a behavioral scientist
makes a decision which affects political values he has stepped into
the legal domain, and he will find that the scientific method is of
little help in solving many of the problems he faces. But even if
we were to accept the contention that parole release decisions are
not legal decisions, this would not dispose of the need for dis-
cipline in making the decisions. The Parole Board needs dis-
ciplined procedure in order to produce more reliable results.
B. The Means of Discipline- The
Administrative Procedures Act
The Parole Board's discretionary powers and haphazard proce-
dures would seem to be most vulnerable when attacked by the
provisions of the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act.37
There seems little doubt that the Act's provisions do in fact apply
to the Parole Board. The Act's applicability is indicated not only
by the words of the statute,38 but also by extensive legislative
history,39 by judicial interpretations, 40 and even by the Board's
Board had only clerical assistance. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, CRIMINAL
STATISTICS, 197 1, Table D I. Assuming both that each board member spends 2,000 hours
a year doing nothing but deciding cases and that no case is considered by more than three
members, a simple calculation indicates that each member has less than twenty minutes to
decide the average case. In fact, many cases are considered by the entire board, and the
board members spend large amounts of time traveling to and from the various institutions.3 7 MAPA, supra note 9.
38 The Act applies to every "agency." "Agency" is defined, in part, as:
[A] state board ... created by ... statute [but not] an agency in the legisla-
tive or judicial branches of state government, the governor, an agency having
direct governing control over an institution of higher education, or the state
civil service commission.
Id. § 24.203(2).
39 MAPA was approved by the Governor on August 12, 1969, to be effective on July 1,
1970. MICHIGAN SENATE JOURNAL, 1969, at 2230. On September 18, 1969, the Governor
created the Michigan Administrative Law Commission "to review, analyze and recom-
mend changes in Public Act 306 (the new Michigan Administrative Procedures Act) which
may be necessary to accomodate the specialized problems of specific agencies operating
under this Act." MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GOVER-
NOR at I (1970). The Governor directed each department of state government to furnish
the Commission with its comments on MAPA and to indicate whether it thought changes
were warranted. He informed the departments that no changes would be supported by the
Governor's office unless they had been considered by the Commission. Executive Direc-
tive No. 1969-1. The Department of Corrections did not respond to this directive. Minutes
of the Commission, Dec. II, 1969, and Dec. 18, 1969 (in the files of Solomon Bienenfeld,
Secretary of the Commission, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing). On Jan. 6, 1970,
the Commission held a public hearing. All state departments received notice of the hearing
and were invited to send representatives to discuss the application of the Act. No
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own rules. 41 However, its impact on the Board's procedures is
much less obvious and requires some careful consideration.
1. The Board's Rulemaking Activities-The statute creating
the Department of Corrections gives rulemaking authority with
reference to parole to the Corrections Commission, the Director
of Corrections, and the Parole Board.4 2 Although the Commission
and the Director have promulgated five pages of rules in accor-
representative of the Department of Corrections attended the hearing. Transcript of the
hearing, at 3 (in Mr. Bienenfeld's files).
The Commission was under pressure to recommend exemption of some agencies or
some agency functions from part or all of the MAPA. Nevertheless, the Commission
reported to the Governor that:
[W]holesale exemptions of agencies or of an agency from the provisions of
Act 306 are not in the public interest. The legislature had an opportunity to
consider recommendations for such exclusions and in every case rejected
them. No agency of government, however complex, should escape the dis-
cipline of providing minimum due process in its procedures.
REPORT, supra at 3.
The Commission recommended several amendments to the MAPA, all of which were
enacted by the legislature and approved by the Governor on June 30, 1970, to take effect
on July 1, 1970, the effective date of the Act. Mich. P.A. 1970, No. 40 §2.
Section II of the amendments proposed by the Commission and enacted by the
legislature read, "This act shall not be construed to repeal additional requirements imposed
by law." According to the Commission's explanation:
The clear intention of the legislature was to establish in Act 306 a basic
pattern of procedural due process to which all agencies would be required to
adhere. This pattern was intended to set minimum, not maximum, procedu-
ral due process. Unfortunately, as drafted, it left the door ajar to in-
terpretation by some agencies that, if their specific statute provided extensive
procedural requirements, they were exempt from the procedural require-
ments of Act 306. The proposed amendment is designed to eliminate the
possibility of such an erroneous interpretation and to preserve the important
public policy of establishing minimum due process in Act 306.
REPORT, supra, at 7.4 0 Two separate panels of the Court of Appeals have held that parole revocation
hearings are governed by the MAPA's provisions regarding contested cases. Feazel v.
Department of Corrections, 31 Mich. App. 425, 188 N.W.2d 59 (1971); Crawford v.
Parole Board, 35 Mich. App. 185, 192 N.W.2d 358 (1971). Parshay v. Warden of
Marquette Prison, 30 Mich. App. 556, 186 N.W.2d 859 (1971), held that a prison inmate
can challenge the validity of prison rules by means of MAPA's declaratory judgment
procedure for challenging agency rules.
41 Mich. Dep't of Corrections R. 791.332(4) (1970), regarding parole violation hearings
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, Act No. 306 of the Public Acts
of the 1969 MAPA being sections 24.201 to 24.313 of the Compiled Laws of
1948, will apply to the hearing.
42 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 791.233, .240(2) (Supp. 1968). The only rulemaking
power explicitly given to the Parole Board relates to the conditions of parole. § 791.233.
However, a Michigan agency has inherent power to adopt procedural rules to govern
activities in which it engages. See MICH. Op. ATTY. GEN. No. 4601 (1967). Authority to
issue legislative rules may be fairly implied from the powers granted the agency and the
nature of its functions. Coffman v. State Bd. of Examiners, 331 Mich. 582, 50 N.W.2d 322
(1951); Salowitz v. State Bd. of Registration, 285 Mich. 214, 280 N.W. 737 (1938); Ranke
v. Corp. and Sec. Com'n, 317 Mich. 304, 26 N.W.2d 898 (1947); INSTITUTE OF CONTIN-
UING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE NEW MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 50-51 (R.
Cramton & G. Holmes eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as CRAMTON[.
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dance with the MAPA, 43 the Parole Board has promulgated none.
The rules promulgated by the Commission and the Director are
mostly interpretive or repetitive of the statutes governing parole
procedure. They include no rules of evidence, and the only sub-
stantive rule governing parole release is a list of eight factors to be
considered by the Board when making release decisions. 44 The
factors are irrelevant to the Board's practice. Members of the
Board do not refer to them when discussing cases; and to the
limited extent that reasons are given for decisions, the reasons are
not couched in terms of the factors.
This is not to say, however, that the Board's decisions are
wholly arbitrary and capricious. In some cases the only commu-
nication among Board members before a particular decision is
made consists of glances and nods. The ability to achieve an
agreement after such minimal nonverbal communication can be
explained only by assuming that there are certain internally under-
stood generalizations which dictate a particular result in certain
fact situations. Furthermore, the Board's case load simply does
not allow a fresh determination of weighty and complex issues of
personal rehabilitation and public safety in the time available for
consideration of each separate case. 45
There must therefore be some standards upon which the Board
43 Mich. Dep't of Corrections R. 791.301, .321-.329, .331-.334, .341-.343, .351 (1970).
It is not known whether all of the MAPA's requirements were complied with in the
promulgation of these rules, but because they antedate the effective date of the MAPA,
they remain in effect until amended or rescinded. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §24.231
(Supp. 1972).
44 Mich. Dep't of Corrections R. 791.322 (1970) provides the following factors to be
considered in granting paroles:
(2) The following factors relating to the prisoner are among those which may
be considered by the parole board in a determination to grant or deny parole:
(a) Institutional work and conduct record, but this will be given only min-
imum consideration.
(b) Previous criminal record, nature and circumstances of the crime, and
length of sentence.
(c) Previous industrial and social history.
(d) Character, physical and mental condition, record and achievements at the
Institution, including general conduct, school and industrial records.
(e) Home or environment to which he plans to return.
(f) Nature and kind of employment or other program which has been se-
cured. In case of illness or other physical incapacity, arrangements shall
be made for suitable care.
(g) Mental and social attitudes and behavior with respect to the welfare of
society and the public.
(h) Attitudes of the sentencing judge, prosecuting attorney, or their succes-
sors in office, and of the community from which the prisoner was
sentenced, if known.
4 It was estimated that each Board member probably has no more than twenty minutes,
and possibly much less, in which to consider each case. See note 36 supra.
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bases its decisions as to who should be released and under what
conditions. Professor Dawson has identified seventeen of these
unwritten criteria,46 and observation of the Board's deliberations
indicates that many of these are applied with some regularity.
This would mean that the criteria reflected in the Board's deci-
sions are not chosen arbitrarily, but in accordance with some
ascertainable pattern. To the extent that such regularities are
characteristic of the Board's decisions, they may be said to repre-
sent norms of decision-making.
MAPA defines a rule as:
[Ain agency regulation, statement, standard, policy, ruling or
instruction of general applicability, which implements or ap-
plies law enforced or administered by the agency, or which
prescribes the organization, procedure or practice of the
agency, including the amendment, suspension or decision
thereof, but does not include the following:
(f) A determination, decision or order in a contested case.
(g) An intergovernmental, interagency or intra-agency memo-
randum, directive or communication which does not
affect the rights of, or procedures and practices available
to the public.
(h) A form with instructions, an interpretive statement, a
guideline, an informational pamphlet or other material
which in itself does not have the force and effect of law
but is merely explanatory.
(i) A declaratory ruling or other disposition of a particular
matter as applied to a specific set of facts involved.
(j) A decision by an agency to exercise or not to exercise a
permissive statutory power, although private rights or
interests are affected thereby.47
The Parole Board's norms of decision certainly seem to fit
comfortably within this definition of a rule. Each of these norms is
"an agency ... standard [or] policy ... of general applicability,
46 Dawson, supra note 32, at 249-85. Based on a study of practices in Kansas, Mich-
igan, and Wisconsin, the following factors were identified and illustrated: (1) psychological
change, (2) participation in institutional programs, (3) institutional adjustment, (4) criminal
record, (5) prior experience under community supervision, (6) parole plan, (7) circum-
stances of the offense, (8) seriousness of the anticipated violation, (9) nearness of the
mandatory release date, (10) length of time served, (11) parole to a detainer, (12) reward
for informant services, (13) brutality of the offense, (14) supporting institutional discipline,
(15) minimum amount of time, (16) potential benefit to the inmate, and (17) avoidance of
criticism of the parole system.
41 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.207 (Supp. 1972). The omitted sections consist of
exceptions related to specific matters outside the jurisdiction of the Parole Board.
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which implements or applies law. .. administered by the agency,
or which prescribes the ... procedure or practice of the
agency.... "48
It seems fairly clear that what the Parole Board has done is to
order its business of decision-making according to a set of norms
which fall within MAPA's definition of rules but which have not
been formally enacted and promulgated according to the proce-
dures set out in the Act. 9 They have in large part been given no
explicit recognition of any sort. Yet they are highly significant
determinants of actual parole release decisions.
2. The Legal Status and Effect of Unarticulated Rules-An
initial difficulty in assessing the Act's impact on unarticulated
rules results from its failure to specify the exact consequences of
a rule's existence. Although the Act details certain procedures
which must be followed in order to process a rules,50 it does not
state that every rule must be processed.' It does provide, how-
ever, that:
(1) An agency shall promulgate rules describing its organ-
ization and stating the general course and method of its
operations and may include therein forms with in-
structions ....
(2) An agency shall promulgate rules prescribing its proce-
dures available to the public and the methods by which
the public may obtain information and submit requests.
48 Subsections (f), (i), and (j) do not apply because the norms of the Parole Board are not
decisions but rather guides for decision and practice; (g) does not apply because these
norms do affect the rights of prisoners and the procedures available to prisoners, who
presumably are members of the public; and (h) does not apply because the rules of the
Board, being unarticulated, are not explanatory but do have the force and effect of law.
The general effect of this definition is to include what may be classed as legislative and
procedural rules within the Act, and to exclude purely descriptive or interpretive rules.
CRAMTON, supra note 42, at 47-53, 56-58. It might seem superficially plausible to class
the Board's rulemaking activities as purely descriptive or interpretive, on the grounds that
they are merely expounding upon the general criteria for release found in the statute
(MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.233 (1968)). This argument loses its force, however,
when it is remembered that, as previously noted (see text accompanying notes 31-32
supra ), the statute does not say when a prisoner should be paroled, only when he may not
be. And even these restrictions are so generally phrased that any rules implementing them
cannot be said to follow in any meaningful sense from the statute alone. Finally, the statute
itself apparently recognizes its vague and incomplete character by specifically authorizing
the Board to formulate conditions for parole. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 791.235 (1968), which provides that "the parole board shall reach its own conclusions as
to the desirability of releasing such prisoner on parole."
49 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.231-264 (Supo. 1972).50 Id. §§ 24.23 1-.264.
51 Several terms are to be distinguished. "Adoption of a rule" according to MAPA
means "the formal action of an agency establishing a rule before its promulgation." Id.
§ 24.203(). "Promulgation of a rule" is a further step which consists of filing it with the
Secretary of State. Id. § 24.205(6). "Processing of a rule" means all of the procedures
required or authorized by the Act, including adoption, which are to result in its eventual
promulgation. Id. § 24.205(5).
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(3) An agency may promulgate rules, not inconsistent with
this act or other applicable statutes, prescribing proce-
dures for contested cases 2
Thus, the Act indicates certain rules that must be processed and
certain rules that may be processed, but as to a number of rules
the Act is silent. It says nothing about rules describing the spec-
ific, as opposed to general, course and methods of agency oper-
ations; it says nothing about substantive, as opposed to procedur-
al, rules to be applied in contested cases. Even within the ex-
plicitly covered categories, applicability is not always clear. It is
uncertain, for example, just how general the promulgated rules of
operation may be and still satisfy the Act's requirements. Ar-
guably, the very general rules promulgated by the Department of
Corrections relating to parole and Parole Board activities53
suffice. However, if this were so, the provisions of the Act would
be of little practical importance in the parole setting. If in fact
details of procedure and substance are required, then obviously
the Parole Board's unarticulated norms are not in compliance with
the Act.
Deciding on the applicability of the third subsection presents
different interpretive difficulties. It is clear from that subsection
that the promulgation of rules is optional if they are procedural
rather than substantive and if they are used in the context of a
"contested case." The Act defines a contested case as
a proceeding ... in which a determination of the legal rights,
duties or privileges of a named party is required by law to be
made by an agency after an opportunity for evidentiary hear-
ing.54
The procedure by which a decision to release is made does result
in a determination of the rights, duties, or privileges of the prison-
er; but it is not clear whether this determination is required by law
to be made "after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing."
While the appearances of prisoners before the Parole Board are
referred to colloquially as "hearings" by board members, the
statute requiring such appearances 55 does not use the term "hear-
ing" in that regard. Since "hearings" are explicitly required by
statute before the Board can grant parole under certain special
circumstances or before it can revoke parole, 56 the avoidance of
52 1d. § 24.233.
53 See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
54 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.203(3) (Supp. 1972).
55 Id. § 79 1.235 (1968).5 6 Id. §§ 79 1.234, 240a (Supp. 1972).
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the word "hearing" in the statute governing regular release deci-
sions is probably intentional.
Thus, Parole Board appearances, because they are not "hear-
ings," would seem not to fit MAPA's definition of "contested
case." Perhaps the most telling argument for not considering
board procedures to involve contested cases is that so doing,
while making the promulgation of rules optional, would impose a
whole new range of procedural requirements on the Board. 57
MAPA states, inter alia, that parties may, as of right, file written
answers to the required agency notices of hearing, 58 may present
written and oral arguments on issues of law and policy, may
present evidence and argument on issues of fact,59 and may
cross-examine witnesses, including the author of any document
used by the agency in making its determination6 ° This last would
seem to require that a prisoner be able to examine every person
who has contributed to his file. It is obvious that the Board does
not treat its cases even remotely like this, nor could it, given the
exigencies of its job and workload. Five men simply cannot com-
ply with MAPA's procedure for adjudicating contested cases in
each of 10,000 cases a year, and thus far the people and the
legislature have not considered parole release important enough to
justify an allocation of resurces sufficient to support such proce-
dures.
The explicit terms of the Act, then, are of little help in deciding
whether the Parole Board is required to promulgate its unarticu-
lated norms of decision-making. If appearances before the Board
are "contested cases," then promulgation would be optional under
Subsection 24.233(3), but the Board would then be guilty of
violating the Act's procedural requirements for contested cases. If
appearances before the Board are denied the status of contested
cases, then Section 24.233 does not speak to the question of
whether the Board must process it unarticulated rules.
Despite its silence on the issue, there are good reasons for
viewing the Act as requiring the processing of all rules not spe-
cifically exempted by operation of Subsection 24.233(3). The
problem of unarticulated norms which constitute rules has not
been extensively considered. Most of the discussion of adminis-
trative rulemaking has been concerned with the question of
whether an agency has the power to make rules, and the impor-
-1 Id. §§ 24.27 1-292, specifying procedures for contested cases.
58 Id. §§ 24.27 1, .272(2).
59 Id. § 24.272(3).
60 Id. § 24.272(4).
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tant distinction has been that between a rule and an adjudica-
tion.6 1 Two major purposes of administrative procedure acts ap-
pear to have been to define those situations in which an agency
may make rules and in which it must make rules. This problem is
distinct from the question of status of rules which are already
made and followed but not acknowledged. Because focus on this
latter question is only now becoming explicit, it is not surprising
that the Act is somewhat unclear. Nevertheless, the Act's struc-
ture and philosophy do offer some guidance in resolving this issue.
The Act provides a lengthy definition of rules 62 and an elabo-
rate set of procedures to be followed in processing and publishing
rules.63 Those procedures must be followed in adopting and pro-
mulgating a rule or it will be invalid and of no effect. For example,
a hearing must be held prior to the adoption of a rule. 64 Failure to
do so, even though all other steps may have been complied with,
will render any rule so adopted a nullity.65 It seems highly ques-
tionable that the drafters would have intended to allow an agency,
in any situation not specified in Section 24.233, to avoid entirely
these stringent safeguards merely by refusing to process a rule.
This would give to the agency virtually complete power to deter-
mine which rules, if any, should be processed and which should
not. It would make little sense to say that a rule promulgated
without hearings is invalid, but that a rule adopted with neither a
hearing nor promulgation is valid.
Such a result would severely cripple the Act's effectiveness. To
maintain its viability, it is essential that it be read to require the
processing of all norms which fall within its definition of a rule. In
fact, this is the position adopted in Professor Cramton's hand-
61 See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§2.01-.16, 5.01 (1958).
62 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
63 See generally MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 24.23 I-.264 (Supp. 1972). The following
are examples of the mandatory language to be found in these provisions:
§24.241(l) Before the adoption of a rule an agency shall give notice of a
public hearing ...
§ 24.241(2) The agency shall transmit copies of the notice to the joint
committee on administrative rules [and others].
§ 24.24 1(3) The public hearing shall comply with any applicable statute ....
§ 24.242 The agency shall publish the notice as prescribed ....
§ 24.245(2) [Tlhe agency shall transmit by letter copies of the rules.., to the
joint committee on administrative rules.
§ 24.245(6) On formal adoption of a rule, an agency, if requested to do so by
an interested person ... shall issue a concise written statement of the princi-
pal reasons for its actions.
§ 24.246(1) To promulgate a rule an agency shall file in the office of the
Secretary of State 3 copies of the rule ....
SId. § 24.241.




book, The New Michigan Administrative Procedures,66 which
was prepared under the supervision of a special subcommittee of
the State Bar of Michigan for seminars sponsored by the Institute
for Continuing Legal Education and the Administrative Law
Committee of the State Bar. Indeed, the authors seem to have
assumed the mandatory invocation of the rule-processing proce-
dures as a matter not even open to question. "If a matter comes
within the definition of a rule it must be processed and published
in accordance with the procedures [provided for in the Act]." 67
This rationale would apply even to those rules which have been
publicly enunciated in a previous adjudication. If a decision in a
particular matter, whether or not it is a "contested case," is
derived solely from the facts of that case, it is not a rule within the
meaning of the Act, for it is not of general applicability.68 It
represents an ad hoc determination applicable only in that specific
and unique fact situation. If, however, that same determination
were subsequently relied upon in the decision of another matter,
or even if its content were repeated regularly, i.e., "generally
applied," it would then represent a principle or standard of gener-
al applicability because it would be extended beyond the confines
of its generative fact situation, and it would thus fulfill the defini-
tion of a rule. For this reason, the Act's requirements for the
processing of rules cannot be avoided merely by announcing them
in the context of a given case.69 Even though a decision may be
couched in terms of that case's factual context, if the inference it
66 CRAMTON, supra note 42.
6 7 Id. at 4 1.
68 See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
69 Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), where the plurality opinion
asserted that the rulemaking provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970) "may not be avoided by the process of making rules in
the course of adjudicatory proceedings." 394 U.S. at 764. In Excelsior Underwear, Inc.,
156 NLRB 1236 (1966), the NLRB had announced a norm of decision-making (referred to
by the plurality and dissenting opinions in Wyman-Gordon as "the Excelsior rule") which
it declined to apply to the parties in that case but which it would apply in future cases. The
norm required that an employer supply the union with a list of its employees prior to a
representation election. Later, the Board ordered Wyman-Gordon to supply such a list,
citing Excelsior as authority. A majority of the Court (the plurality and the dissenters) held
that the Excelsior norm was not a valid rule because it had not been enacted and
promulgated in accordance with the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. However, the plurality held that the Board's order to Wyman-Gordon was
binding as an independent adjudication and did not need the support of a rule; the fact that
the order was based on the Excelsior norm rather than a new norm derived from the facts
of the Wyman-Gordon case was treated by the plurality as irrelevant. The two dissenters
maintained that the plurality approach ignored the important public policies behind the
rulemaking procedures and vitiated those procedures by making them practically unenfor-
ceable.
The exceptions in the MAPA definition of "rule" rather pointedly avoid exempting
norms announced in adjudication to the extent that they have any prospective effect.
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 24.207(l) (Supp. 1972).
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indicates proves not to be confined to circumstances peculiar to
that case, it represents a norm of general applicability- that is, a
rule. It must be formally processed before it may be applied in
other cases.70
Of course there are objections to this position. One is that the
drafters were well aware of the problem of requiring extant but
unprocessed rules to be formally adopted and promulgated, as
evidenced by the provisions of Section 24.233, which mandate
promulgation in two instances while making it optional in a
third,71 and by language in other Sections, notably 24.231. This
latter provision refers to "laws authorizing or directing an agency
to promulgate rules," 7 2 implying that specific statutory grants of
power outside the MAPA were to be the primary vehicles for
deciding when rules must be promulgated. It is perhaps significant
that under the statutes dealing specifically with the Parole Board
the Board is authorized but not required to adopt rules and regu-
lations. 73
A second objection is that it would be a rational and plausible
interpretation of the Act to view it as providing primarily for
those situations and those agencies in which there is a need and a
desire formally to adopt explicit rules. The prescribed procedures
would insure that this would be done fairly. This would fill a need
quite different from that of making all rules go through the proce-
dures of formal adoption and would by itself constitute a sufficient
justification for the Act.
The difficulty with both of these views is that they would not
only render much of the Act's careful definition of rules merely
gratuitous, 74 but more importantly, they would narrow its scope
so severely as to reduce drastically the impact it seems clearly
intended to have had.75 According to the Cramton handbook the
philosophy of the Act was to require the processing of all legisla-
tive and procedural rules. 76 This accords to the Act a significance
70 Even if it were admitted that the Board could bypass the Act's procedures for
adoption and promulgation by announcing a rule in an adjudication, this would not render
their present practices valid. The only "opinions" written by the Board are terse comments
on the reasons for denying a particular parole, but none of these refer to or pretend to state
rules of general applicability. Presumably the effective enunciation of a rule must be more
explicit and complete than this.
11 See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
72 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 24.231(2) (Supp. 1972).
73 Id. § 791.233. Note that if "adopt" in this statute is read in the technical sense of the
MAPA definition (§ 24.203(1)), it would say nothing about making unarticulated rules, but
only authorize the formal effectuation of rules.
74 See notes 43, 47 and 49 and accompanying text supra.
75 See generally CRAMTON, supra note 42.
76 Id. at 56-58
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commensurate with its elaborate structure and perceived impor-
tance for Michigan administrative practices.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The operation of the Parole Board is designed to reflect a
conviction that both objectives of parole, effective rehabilitation
of the prisoner and protection of the community from possibly
dangerous persons, can best be achieved by a "scientific" deter-
mination of readiness for release and the proper conditions for
release. Examination of the realities of the Board's deci-
sion-making processes reveals, however, that not only is the sci-
entific method not applied and quite probably inapplicable, but in
attempting to achieve this goal the state has eliminated nearly all
due process restrictions on the arbitrary disposition of significant
issues of human liberty. The result has been the unchecked devel-
opment of unarticulated and consequently unexamined operative
norms of decision by the Board. At the very least these norms
should be made explicit, so that they might offer guidance to
affected and potentially affected parties and so they might be
publicly evaluated for their functional congruence with the general
objectives of the institution of parole.
The mechanism most likely to achieve this goal is the Michigan
Administrative Procedures Act, for it appears that the Parole
Board is subject to the Act. In making a parole release decision
the Board generally uses unwritten norms to govern the procedure
and result in the case; these are not derived from the facts of each
case but are rules of general applicability within the meaning of
the Act. Since the Act requires that every rule must be adopted
and promulgated in accordance with certain specified procedures
and since these procedures have not been followed by the Board,
its reliance upon norms which represent unprocessed rules would
seem to be prohibited by the Act.
If the Parole Board is to provide equal justice under law, it
must have rules of law. It does have such rules, but they are
unarticulated, poorly organized, and incomplete. This article has
proposed that the Board should and must begin putting its house
in order by adopting and promulgating the rules it applies and by
developing new rules which are needed to complete its system of
law. Until the Board undertakes this task it cannot assure that
similar cases are similarly decided, nor can it assure the public
that it decides cases rationally. -John P. Quinn*
* Mr. Quinn is a third-year student at the University of Michigan Law School.
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